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Summary
When conducting investigations of the executive branch, congressional
committees and Members of Congress generally receive the information required for
legislative needs.  If agencies fail to cooperate or the President invokes executive
privilege, Congress can turn to a number of legislative powers that are likely to
compel compliance.  The two techniques described in this report are the issuance of
subpoenas and the holding of executive officials in contempt.  These techniques
usually lead to an accommodation that meets the needs of both branches.  Litigation
is used at times, but federal judges generally encourage congressional and executive
parties to settle their differences out of court.  The specific examples in this report
explain how information disputes arise and how they are resolved.
For legal analysis see CRS Report 95-464A, Investigative Oversight: An
Introduction to the Law, Practice, and Procedure of Congressional Inquiry, by
Morton Rosenberg, and CRS Report RS30319, Presidential Claims of Executive
Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments, by Morton Rosenberg.
A number of legislative tools, including subpoenas and contempt citations, are
covered in CRS Report RL30966, Congressional Access to Executive Branch
Information: Legislative Tools, by Louis Fisher.  For a general report on oversight
methods, see CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Congressional Investigations: 
Subpoenas and Contempt Citations
When conducting investigations of the executive branch, congressional
committees and Members of Congress generally receive the information required for
legislative needs.  If agencies fail to cooperate or the President invokes executive
privilege, Congress can turn to a number of legislative powers that are likely to
compel compliance.  The two techniques described in this report are the issuance of
subpoenas and the holding of executive officials in contempt.  These procedures
usually lead to an accommodation that meets the needs of both branches.  Litigation
is used at times, but federal judges generally encourage congressional and executive
parties to settle their differences out of court.  The specific examples in this report
explain how information disputes arise and how they are resolved.
Congressional Investigations
Although the congressional power to investigate is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, the framers understood that legislatures must oversee the
executive branch.  Under British precedents, lawmakers were expected to hold
administrators accountable.  James Wilson, one of the framers and later a Justice on
the Supreme Court, expected the House of Representatives to “form the grand
inquest of the state.  They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from
men and things.”1  In an essay in 1774, he described members of the British House
of Commons as “grand inquisitors of the realm.  The proudest ministers of the
proudest monarchs have trembled at their censures; and have appeared at the bar of
the house, to give an account of their conduct, and ask pardon for their faults.”2
At the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason emphasized that Members of
Congress “are not only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial powers.  They must
meet frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices.”3  Charles Pinckney
submitted a list of congressional prerogatives, including: “Each House shall be Judge
of its own privileges, and shall have authority to punish by imprisonment every
person violating the same.”4  The Constitution, however, provided no express powers
for Congress to investigate, issue subpoenas, or to punish for contempt.  What was
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left silent would be filled within a few years by implied powers and legislative
practice.
Early Precedents 
During the First Congress, the House debated a request from Robert Morris to
investigate his conduct as Superintendent of Finance during the period of the
Continental Congress.  The matter was referred to a select committee consisting of
three Members.5  The Senate adopted a different approach, preferring to authorize
President George Washington to appoint three commissioners to look into the matter
and report the results to Congress.6  The House persisted with its committee, which
issued a report on February 16, 1791.7  The House committee investigation did not
produce a total collision between the two branches because the area of inquiry
concerned activities that occurred during the previous Continental Congress.
Nevertheless, the House inquiry is significant because the House decided, as noted
by James Madison, that it was necessary for Congress to acquire information in order
to “do justice” to the country and to public officers.8
A 1790 request from Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton to Congress,
seeking financial compensation for Baron von Steuben, triggered an early executive-
legislative clash over access to documents.  Although Hamilton initially withheld
some materials from Congress, lawmakers received sufficient access to documents
to permit passage of a bill for Steuben.9  In this confrontation the leverage of
Congress was formidable.  Without cooperation from the Administration, Congress
could refuse to pass the bill.
In 1792, the House conducted a major investigation by appointing a committee
to inquire into the heavy military losses suffered by the troops of Maj. Gen. Arthur
St. Clair to Indian tribes.  The committee was empowered “to call for such persons,
papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”10  According to the
account of Thomas Jefferson, President Washington convened his Cabinet to
consider the House request.  The Cabinet considered and agreed,
first, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries.
Second, that it might call for papers generally.  Third, that the Executive ought
to communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought to refuse
those, the disclosure of which would injure the public: consequently were to
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exercise a discretion.  Fourth, that neither the committee nor the House had a
right to call on the Head of a Department, who and whose papers were under the
President alone; but that the committee should instruct their chairman to move
the House to address the President.11
The Cabinet concluded that “there was not a paper which might not be properly
produced.”12  The House committee examined papers furnished by the executive
branch, listened to explanations from department heads and other witnesses, and
received a written statement from General St. Clair.13  The general principle of
executive privilege had been established because the President could refuse papers
“the disclosure of which would injure the public.”  The injury had to be to the public,
not to the President or his associates. 
The first use of the investigative power to protect the dignity of the House
occurred in 1795.  William Smith, a Representative from South Carolina, announced
that a Robert Randall had confided in him a plan to seek a grant of some twenty
million acres from Congress, to be divided into forty shares.  More than half that
amount would be reserved to lawmakers who assisted him.  The House passed a
resolution directing the Sergeant at Arms to arrest Randall and one of his associates,
Charles Whitney.14  On January 6, 1796, the House concluded that Randall had been
guilty of contempt and a breach of House privileges by attempting to corrupt the
integrity of its Members.  He was brought to the bar of the House, reprimanded,
recommitted to custody, and released a week later.15
Four years later, the Senate opened an investigation into material published by
William Duane, editor of the Aurora newspaper.16  The Federalist Senate, voting 20
to 8 along party lines, regarded language in the newspaper as “false, defamatory,
scandalous, and malicious; tending to defame the Senate of the United States, and to
bring them into contempt and disrepute, and to excite against them the hatred of the
good people of the United States.”17  Duane was ordered to appear at the bar of the
Senate to defend his conduct.  He appeared and asked for the assistance of counsel,
which the Senate granted.  He then refused to return, explaining that he was “bound
by the most sacred duties to decline any further voluntary attendance upon that body,
and leave them to pursue such measures in this case as, in their wisdom, they may
deem meet.”18  
CRS-4
19  Id. at 123.
20  James Morton Smith, Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Law and American Civil
Liberties 297-98 (1956).
21  Id. at 306; Annals of Cong., 6th Cong., 1st-2d Sess. at 184.
22  Annals of Cong., 12th Cong., 1st Sess. 1255-74.
23 Annals of Cong., 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 580-83, 592-609, 777-90 (1818).
24 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 228 (1821). 
25  The Senate, a continuing body, is not limited by the expiration of a Congress; McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181-82 (1927).
It was for that action, and not the published material, that the Senate voted 16-12
to hold him in contempt.19 A warrant was issued for his arrest, but Duane managed
to stay a step ahead of the Sergeant at Arms.20  The Senate adopted a resolution (13
to 4) requesting the President to prosecute Duane in the courts.  He was indicted by
a federal grand jury, but after several postponements was never convicted.21
The first committee witness punished for contempt of the House was Nathaniel
Rounsavell, a newspaper editor, charged in 1812 with releasing sensitive information
to the press.  After being held in custody, he admitted that part of the source of his
story was overhearing a conversation between Members of the House, but refused to
identify the lawmakers or say where the conversation took place.  In a letter he
disclaimed any intention of showing disrespect to the House.  Rep. John Smilie then
identified himself as the Member who Rounsavell overheard, stating that the
information that appeared in the newspaper was “of no importance” and that if the
House wanted a victim he offered himself as a substitute for Rounsavell.  The
Speaker asked Rounsavell whether he was willing to answer questions put to him.
After he agreed that he was, the House voted that he had purged himself of contempt
and he was released.22
Judicial Guidelines
The Supreme Court first placed limits on congressional investigations in
Anderson v. Dunn (1821).  Rep. Lewis Williams informed the House that a Col. John
Anderson had offered him $500 if he would reciprocate with certain favors.  The
House ordered the Sergeant at Arms to take Anderson into custody.  After
interrogation by the Speaker, the House voted Anderson in contempt and in violation
of the privileges of the House.  The Speaker reprimanded him and released him from
custody.23  The Supreme Court upheld the House action as a valid exercise in self-
preservation.  Without the power to punish for contempt, the House would be left
“exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even
conspiracy may mediate against it.”24  However, the Court ruled that the power to
punish for contempt was not unlimited.  The House had to exercise the least possible
power adequate to fulfill legislative needs (in this case, the power of imprisonment),
and the duration of punishment could not exceed the life of the legislative body.
Thus, imprisonment had to cease when the House adjourned at the end of a
Congress.25
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As a result of this decision, it would be possible for someone to violate the
dignity of the House in the closing days of a Congress and be punished only for the
remaining period.  To handle such situations, Congress passed legislation in 1857 to
enforce the attendance of witnesses on the summons of either House.  If an individual
fails to appear or refuses to answer pertinent questions, that person can be indicted
for misdemeanor in the courts.26  Witnesses can invoke their Fifth Amendment right
not to incriminate themselves.
Initially the Court defined the legislative power to investigate somewhat
narrowly.  In 1881, it spoke of Congress investigating only with “valid legislation”
in mind.27  That particular case concerned the power of Congress to investigate the
affairs of private citizens engaged in a real-estate pool.  If the individuals committed
a crime or offence, the Court said the judiciary would be the proper branch to act.
The Court worried about “a fruitless investigation into the personal affairs of
individuals.”28
Later judicial rulings came to recognize a much greater sweep to congressional
authority.  In 1927, the Court faced a situation where Congress looked not into the
activities of people in the private sector but rather the conduct of the executive
branch, particularly the administration of the Justice Department.  The Court first
stated that “the power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary of the legislative function.”29  Congress could not legislate
“wisely or effectively in the absence of information.”30  Unlike the decision in 1881,
the Court in 1927 did not confine congressional investigations to “valid legislation.”
Congress had a right to seek information “for legislative purposes.”31  The Court
recognized that the Senate resolution that launched the investigation of the Justice
Department
does not in terms avow that it is intended to be in aid of legislation; but it does
show that the subject to be investigated was the administration of the Department
of Justice––whether its functions were being properly discharged or were being
neglected or mistreated, and particularly whether the Attorney General and his
assistants were performing or neglecting their duties in respect of the institution
and prosecution of proceedings to punish crimes and enforce appropriate
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It was enough, said the Court, that the subject of investigation “was one on
which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the information
which the investigation was calculated to elicit.”33  That is, a potential for legislation
was sufficient.  A congressional investigation could have legislation as a possible, but
not a necessary, outcome.  Investigation as pure oversight into the operations of the
executive branch was adequate justification.
To accomplish the purpose of legislation or oversight, each House is entitled to
compel witnesses to provide testimony pertinent to the legislative inquiry.34  Even the
“potential” theory too narrowly circumscribes legislative investigations.  Courts
recognize that committee investigations may take researchers up “blind alleys” and
into nonproductive enterprises: “To be a valid legislative inquiry there need by no
predictable end result.”35
Subpoenas
The Supreme Court has described the congressional power of inquiry as “an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”36  The issuance of a
subpoena pursuant to an authorized investigation is “an indispensable ingredient of
lawmaking.”37  This section describes how committee subpoenas are used to force
testimony and the release of documents, and how Congress can grant immunity to
individuals who exercise their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The particular examples of subpoena power selected here include these actions: Rep.
John Moss arrayed against the Federal Trade Commission, a House subcommittee
requesting documents regarding Justice Department policy on seizing suspects
abroad, a conflict between a House committee and the Justice Department involving
the Inslaw affair, and a Senate committee seeking documents on Whitewater. 
Issuing a Subpoena
Lawmakers and their committees usually obtain the information they need for
legislation or oversight without threats of subpoenas.  They understand that
committee investigations have to satisfy certain standards.  Legislative inquiries must
be authorized by Congress, pursue a valid legislative purpose, raise questions
relevant to the issue being investigated, and inform witnesses why questions put to
them are pertinent.38  Congressional inquiries may not interfere with adjudicatory
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proceedings before a department or agency.39  Other arguments may be offered to
resist a subcommittee subpoena, such as the need to protect confidential trade secrets
or to protect information within the Justice Department,40 but those justifications can
be overridden by legislative needs.  
 
Federal courts give great deference to congressional subpoenas.  If the
investigative effort falls within the “legitimate legislative sphere,” the congressional
activity––including subpoenas––is protected by the absolute prohibition of the
Speech or Debate Clause, which prevents Members of Congress from being
“questioned in any other place.”  In a 1975 case, the Supreme Court ruled that such
legislative activities are immune from judicial interference.41  A concurrence by
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stewart did not agree that “the constitutionality of
a congressional subpoena is always shielded from more searching judicial inquiry.”42
In a dissent, Justice Douglas rejected the majority’s position regarding broad
legislative immunity from judicial review.43
As a tool of legislative inquiries, both Houses of Congress authorize their
committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas to require the production of
documents and the attendance of witnesses regarding matters within the committee’s
jurisdiction.  Committee subpoenas “have the same authority as if they were issued
by the entire House of Congress from which the committee is drawn.”44  If a witness
refuses to testify or produce papers in response to a committee subpoena, and the
committee votes to report a resolution of contempt to the floor, the full House or
Senate may vote in support of the contempt citation.  
Committees and subcommittees are authorized to request, by subpoena, “the
attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it considers
necessary.”  For a committee or subcommittee to issue a subpoena, a majority must
be present, although the power to authorize and issue subpoenas may be delegated
to the committee chairman.45  Committee rules can vary the procedures for issuing
subpoenas.
A congressional subpoena identifies the name of the committee or
subcommittee; the date, time, and place of the hearing a witness is to attend; and the
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particular kind of documents sought.  A subpoena may state that if the documents are
delivered by a particular date, the person who has custody over the documents need
not appear.  Congressional subpoenas are typically served by the U.S. Marshal’s
office or by committee staff.  The Senate has statutory authority to seek civil
enforcement of its subpoenas over private individuals.46  The House relies on its rules
and criminal contempt statutes.47 
It is rare for an executive official to wholly sidestep a congressional subpoena.
In 1989, a House subcommittee issued a subpoena to former Housing and Urban
Development Secretary Samuel Pierce.  He appeared, but invoked his constitutional
right not to incriminate himself.  He became the first former or current Cabinet
official to invoke the Fifth Amendment since the Teapot Dome scandal of 1923.48
In 1991, Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher became the first sitting Cabinet
officer to refuse to appear before a congressional committee to explain why he would
not comply with a subpoena.49
In 1981, Attorney General William French Smith issued an opinion that
analyzed how the Administration should respond to a congressional subpoena.  He
concluded that when Congress issues a subpoena as part of a “legislative oversight
inquiry,” access by Congress has less justification than when it seeks information for
legislative purposes.50  He acknowledged that Congress “does have a legitimate
interest in obtaining information to assist it in enacting, amending, or repealing
legislation.”  Yet “the interest of Congress in obtaining information for oversight
purposes is, I believe, considerably weaker than its interest when specific legislative
proposals are in question.”51  This distinction between legislation and oversight is not
so crisp.  It is well established that Congress has as much constitutional right to
oversee the execution of a law as to pass it.  Moreover, even if such a distinction
could be created, Congress could easily erase it by introducing a bill to “justify”
every oversight proceeding.
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Immunity
Private citizens, more so than executive agency officers, may invoke certain
constitutional protections, such as the First Amendment rights of free association and
free speech.  Witnesses may claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.52  A witness before a congressional committee has a constitutional
right not “to be a witness against himself.”53  If a witness refuses to testify by
invoking the Fifth Amendment, Congress can vote to force testimony by granting the
witness either partial or full immunity. 
By majority vote of either House or a two-thirds vote of a committee, Congress
may request a federal court to issue an order that compels a witness to testify, giving
the witness either partial immunity or full immunity.  Partial immunity (“use
immunity”) means that the person’s testimony may not be used against him in a
criminal case, although the person might be prosecuted on the basis of other
information.  Full immunity (“transactional immunity”) offers absolute protection
against prosecution for the  offense.
During the Iran-Contra investigation in 1987, Congress offered partial immunity
to several witnesses, including Col. Oliver North.  He was later convicted of three
felonies, but those charges were subsequently dismissed because of his immunized
testimony.  Under  standards imposed by the D.C. Circuit, prosecutors must show
that a defendant’s testimony could have had no influence on the witnesses called to
a trial.  Otherwise, the remarks of the witnesses are “tainted” and may not be used to
convict.54  Immunized congressional testimony can, therefore, present a formidable
problem for later prosecution.
In such situations Congress decides whether it is more important to inform itself
and the public rather than to have a successful prosecution.  Lawrence Walsh, the
independent counsel for Iran-Contra, described this setting of national priorities: “If
the Congress decides to grant immunity, there is no way that it can be avoided.  They
have the last word and that is a proper distribution of power. . . . The legislative
branch has the power to decide whether it is more important perhaps even to destroy
a prosecution than to hold back testimony they need.”55 
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The Ashland Case 
A dispute between a House subcommittee and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) began on April 16, 1975, when the commission issued an order requiring
Ashland Oil, Inc. to submit information on Ashland’s estimates of natural gas
reserves on various leases.  Ashland submitted the information on August 27, stating
that the information was confidential and of a proprietary nature, and that disclosure
to competitors would cause injury to Ashland.56
On October 6, in his capacity as a Member of Congress, John Moss asked the
commission to make available to him data gathered by the commission relating to
energy development on federal lands.  FTC denied the request for the reason that the
data sought constituted “trade secrets and commercial or financial information [and]
geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells,”
and that such materials were exempt from mandatory disclosure under subsections
(b)(4) and (b)(9) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).57  Moss had to point out
that FOIA specifically provides that the procedure for withholding certain
information from the public has nothing to do with Congress.  The procedure “is not
authority to withhold information from Congress.”58  Moss proceeded to make a
second request for the material, this time as chairman of the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation (of House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce).
After the commission agreed to furnish Moss with the information, Ashland Oil
went to court to enjoin the FTC from releasing the data.  At that point the
subcommittee issued a subpoena on December 2, ordering the FTC chairman to
appear the following day with the requested documents.59  On the deadline day, the
commission wrote to Moss, advising him that on November 24 a district judge had
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the commission “from disclosing the
documents to any third party, including Congress . . . .”60  With the matter tied up in
court, the House Committee on House Administration reported a resolution on
December 17, providing for the appointment of a special counsel to represent the
House and the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in judicial
proceedings related to the subpoena.  The committee vote for the resolution was
strongly bipartisan, 17 to 2.61 
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The full House passed the resolution on December 18, authorizing Moss to
intervene and appear in the case in order to secure the information needed for his
subcommittee.  Wayne Hayes, chairman of the Committee on House Administration,
explained that the judicial proceedings “infringe upon the rights of the House of
Representatives or that could infringe upon the rights of the House of
Representatives.”62  The resolution passed without a dissent.   
A federal district court agreed that the data at issue constituted “trade secret”
information within the purview of Section 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.63  However, the court noted that the restrictions in FOIA do not refer to
Congress,64 and that the information sought in the subpoena was properly within the
subcommittee’s jurisdiction.65  Finally, the court ruled that Ashland Oil had failed to
show that release of the material to the subcommittee would irreparably injure the
company.  The court rejected the argument that the transfer of the data from the FTC
to the subcommittee would lead “inexorably to either public dissemination or
disclosure to Ashland’s competitors.”  Courts must assume that congressional
committees “will exercise their powers responsibly and with due regard for the rights
of affected parties.”66  
That decision was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.67  A dissenting judge concluded
that the subpoena was invalid, but the majority noted that FTC’s decision to turn over
the materials to the subcommittee “was not based on––and in fact
predated––issuance of the subpoena.”68  The commission had agreed to provide Moss
with the material after receiving the letter in his capacity as subcommittee chairman.
The majority pointed out that the dissent’s discussion of the subpoena “rests solely
on an interpretation of statements made by the Government counsel during oral
argument.”69
Seizing Suspects Abroad
Beginning in 1989, Congress held hearings on whether the FBI could seize a
suspect from a foreign country without the cooperation and consent of that country.
On November 8, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee received
testimony from William P. Barr, head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the
Justice Department, State Department Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer, and Oliver
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B. Revell, Associate Deputy Director of Investigations in the FBI.70  Although OLC
concluded in 1980 that the FBI had no authority to make such arrests,71 Barr
explained that OLC had reexamined its position and issued an opinion on June 21,
1989, partially reversing the 1980 opinion.72  Notwithstanding publication of the first
opinion, Barr insisted that the second “must remain confidential.”73  Although he
refused to release the 1989 opinion, he offered  to explain “our conclusions and our
reasoning to the committee.”74  He gave reasons why he regarded the 1980 opinion
as “flawed.”75
Sofaer noted that Barr had restricted his analysis to the application of domestic
legal authority to kidnappings abroad.  Under international law, Sofaer said, such
kidnappings are a violation.  He continued: “While Congress and the President have
the power to depart from international law, the courts have in effect insisted that they
do so unambiguously and deliberately.  This doctrine reflects how our Nation’s
respect for international law is built into our domestic legal system, and the high
value accorded that law in theory and practice.”76
Initially, the Administration decided to withhold the document.  Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh wrote to the subcommittee on November 28, 1989,
explaining why it could not have the 1989 opinion: “Apart from classified
information, there is no category of documents in the Department’s possession that
I consider more confidential than legal opinions to me from the Office of Legal
Counsel.”77  Subcommittee chair Don Edwards replied that OLC opinions had been
made available to Congress in previous years.78  In a letter on January 24, 1990,
Edwards provided Thornburgh with other examples of OLC opinions being released
to Congress.79 
On January 31, 1990, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Jack
Brooks, wrote to Thornburgh about a number of difficulties that Congress had
experienced in receiving executive branch documents.  With regard to the OLC
opinion on extraterritorial arrests, Brooks said:
There should be no question that this is a matter involving an extremely serious
national policy to which both the Congress and the Executive Branch should give
CRS-13
80  Id. at 102.
81  Id. at 119.
82  Id. at 120-21.
83  Joan Biskupic, “Panel Challenges Thornburgh Over Right to Documents,” CQ Weekly
Rep., July 27, 1991, at 2080.
84  David Johnston, “Administration to Fight House Panel’s Subpoena,” New York Times,
July 30, 1991, at A12. 
85  David Johnston, “Both Sides Softening Stance on Documents on Foreign Arrests,” New
York Times, August 1, 1991, at B7; “Justice Yields to House, Averting Showdown,” CQ
(continued...)
extremely careful consideration.  No purpose is served by denying Congress
access to all of the legal thought and analysis that have been directed to this
issue, including that upon which the Justice Department relied in reaching its
decision.  I do not believe that it is either legally supportable or in the nation’s
best interests for the Justice Department to pick and choose which opinions of
the Office of Legal Counsel are made available to the Congress.  Indeed, it is my
understanding that these opinions are published periodically.  There is no
justification for shielding them from Congressional access at the precise moment
that critical decisions are being made.80
Responding on February 20, 1990, Thornburgh suggested to Brooks a possible
accommodation.  As a substitute for the OLC opinion, the Justice Department would
prepare “a comprehensive written statement of the Department’s legal position on
these issues.”81  Thornburgh concluded that he was “not sure it is useful for us to
exchange volleys over competing legal theories on this issue.  No concrete dispute
over national security information is before us.  What is important is that on a
practical, day-to-day basis we are able to work out our differences in this sensitive
area in good faith.”82
The two sides, however, were unable to reach an acceptable accommodation,
resulting in the issuance of a subcommittee subpoena on July 25, 1991.  The
subcommittee argued that it needed the 1989 memo to determine whether it was
necessary for Congress to legislate in this area.  Unless Thornburgh turned over the
document by 9 a.m. on July 31, the committee would vote to hold him in contempt.83
The Administration decided not to comply with the subpoena, preferring instead to
assert executive privilege.  Some Administration officials argued that release of the
document might jeopardize the criminal prosecution of such defendants as General
Manuel Antonio Noriega, who was arrested in Panama in January 1990, after the
U.S. invasion.  Brooks denied this line of reasoning: “This committee’s request will
in no way expose sensitive information to the public nor will it in any way deter or
slow criminal prosecutions in these matters.”84  
 As the interbranch collision neared, the two sides were able to find some
common ground.  The President decided not to invoke executive privilege, and the
Justice Department agreed to allow one or more committee members to review the
legal memo if the subcommittee would suspend the subpoena and remove the threat
of a contempt vote.85
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The Inslaw Affair
During the same time period as the confrontation over the kidnapping memo,
the House and the Justice Department engaged in another showdown.  On December
5, 1990, Chairman Brooks convened a hearing of the Judiciary Committee to review
the refusal of Attorney General Thornburgh to provide the committee with access to
all documents regarding a civil dispute brought by Inslaw, Inc., a computer company.
Inslaw charged that high-level officials in the Justice Department conspired to force
Inslaw into bankruptcy and have its computer software program, called PROMIS,
transferred or bought by a rival company to help the department keep track of civil
and criminal cases.  Federal Bankruptcy Judge George Bason had already ruled that
the Justice Department “took, converted, and stole” Inslaw’s proprietary software,
using “trickery, fraud, and deceit.”86
The Justice Department denied these charges, claiming that what was at stake
was a contract dispute.  Brooks said that the controversy reached the highest levels
of the department, including at least two Assistant Attorneys General, a Deputy
Attorney General, and Attorney General Edwin Meese.  Because House and Senate
investigating committees had been denied access to documents needed to establish
the department’s guilt or innocence, Brooks concluded that he was “even more
convinced that the allegations concerning INSLAW must be fully and independently
investigated by the committee.”87 
Although the committee and the Justice Department were in disagreement over
access to particular documents, the ranking member of the committee, Hamilton Fish,
pointed out that the department had given considerable assistance to the legislative
investigation, arranging for over fifty interviews with departmental employees,
handing over “voluminous written materials,” and providing space for congressional
staff.88  In a letter to Fish, Assistant Attorney General W. Lee Rawls noted that in an
accommodation with House Judiciary, “the Department did not insist on its usual
practice of having a Department representative at these interviews.”89  Committee
staff also had access, pursuant to a confidentiality agreement, “to the files reflecting
investigations by the Office of Professional Responsibility, and we have provided
documents generated during investigations by the Criminal Division into allegations
of wrongdoing relating to Inslaw.”90  Committee staff were allowed to depose
departmental employees “without the presence of Department counsel,” and were
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given access to the Civil Division’s files on the Inslaw litigation.  Out of tens of
thousands of documents, the department “withheld only a minute fraction, which are
privileged attorney work product that would not be available to a party in litigation
with the United States.”91
At the hearing, the committee heard testimony from Steven R. Ross, House
General Counsel, who analyzed the Attorney General’s decision to withhold
documents because of pending civil litigation and the need for the department to
protect litigation strategy and agency work products.92  Ross took exception to the
position advanced by Rawls in his letter to Rep. Fish that congressional
investigations “are justifiable only as a means of facilitating the task of passing
legislation.”  Such a standard, Ross said, would “eradicate the time-honored role of
Congress of providing oversight, which is a means that has been upheld by the
Supreme Court on a number of occasions, by which the Congress can assure itself
that previously passed laws are being properly implemented.”93  Fish intervened at
that point to agree that the sentence by Rawls was “not a technically correct statement
of the power of the Congress” and was “far too narrow.”94
Ross also challenged the claim by the Justice Department that it could deny
Congress documents to protect pending litigation.  Ross reviewed previous decisions
by the Supreme Court to demonstrate that information could not be withheld from
Congress simply because of “the pendency of lawsuits.”95  The congressional
investigation of Anne Gorsuch, discussed in the next section, was cited by Ross as
another example of the Justice Department labeling documents as “enforcement
sensitive” or “litigation sensitive” to keep materials from Congress.96
The media picked up the clash between Brooks and the Justice Department.97
Finally, on July 25, 1991, a subcommittee of House Judiciary issued a subpoena to
Thornburgh.  A newspaper story said that the night before the subcommittee was
scheduled to vote on the subpoena, the Justice Department indicated that it was
willing to turn over the Inslaw documents.  Brooks, given recent departmental
promises, reportedly said he was too skeptical to accept the offer.98  He wanted the
documents to decide whether the department had acted illegally by engaging in
criminal conspiracy.   When the committee failed to receive the materials, Brooks
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said that the committee would consider contempt of Congress proceedings against
the department.99  
At that point several hundred documents were delivered to the committee, which
later released a formal investigative report on the Inslaw affair.100  The committee
gained access to sensitive files of the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) in
the Justice Department and received more than 400 documents that the department
had described as related to “ongoing litigation and other highly sensitive matters and
‘protected’ under the claims of attorney-client and attorney work product
privileges.”101
Whitewater Notes
On December 8, 1995, the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Whitewater
Development Corporation and Related Matters (the Senate Whitewater Committee)
issued a subpoena for certain documents.  The White House announced that it would
withhold material concerning a November 5, 1993, meeting at the law offices of
Williams & Connolly, which had been retained by President Clinton and First Lady
Hillary Clinton to provide personal counsel for Whitewater-related matters.  Senior
presidential aides and private lawyers discussed whether documents sought by
Congress could be withheld on the ground that they were protected by the lawyer-
client privilege and executive privilege.  Present at the meeting were White House
Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, White House aides Neil Eggleston and Bruce Lindsey,
three private attorneys (David Kennedy, Stephen Engstrom, and James Lyon), and
Associate White House Counsel William Kennedy, who took extensive notes at the
meeting.102  President Clinton said that he believed the President “ought to have a
right to have a confidential conversation with his minister, his doctor, his lawyer.”103
That argument would carry weight if Clinton had met solely with private
attorneys, but his claim was complicated by the presence of four government lawyers
at the meeting.  Government lawyers are not expected to provide advice to Presidents
on private financial and legal matters, and certainly not on the same confidential
basis as a private attorney.  Lloyd Cutler, when he was appointed Special Counsel to
President Clinton, explained: “When it comes to a President’s private affairs,
particularly private affairs that occurred before he took office, those should be
handled by his own personal private counsel, and in my view not by the White House
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Counsel.”104  Moreover, communications between a government attorney and an
executive official lack the confidentiality that exists between a private attorney and
an executive official.  Under law, any government attorney who learns of “[a]ny
information, allegation, or complaint” involving government officers and employees
shall report such matter to the Attorney General, with certain exceptions.105  Aware
of that statute, government attorneys should alert officials in the government, “even
the President, . . . not to expect counsel to keep confidential what a private counsel
would in such a situation.”106
Within a few days, the White House offered to turn over the Kennedy notes if
the committee agreed that the meeting was privileged.  The committee refused
because it learned of other meetings attended by White House officials and private
attorneys.  As part of the effort to compromise, the White House told the committee
that it could assume that whatever material White House officials had obtained about
Whitewater, including confidential documents from the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC), had been turned over to Clinton’s private lawyers during the meeting.  Some
Republicans regarded it as improper for the White House to pass along confidential
RTC or any other law enforcement documents to the President’s private lawyers.
Unable to reach an acceptable compromise, the committee voted to send the issue to
the Senate floor and from there to federal district court.107  Clinton objected that he
should not be “the first president in history” to give up his right to attorney-client
confidentiality.108 
 
By December 15, the White House had indicated its willingness to drop most
of the conditions it had established for turning over the Kennedy notes to the
committee.  The change occurred hours after the committee voted to ask the full
Senate to go to court to enforce the subpoena.109  As a step toward an
accommodation, the chairman of the Senate committee said he would be willing “to
send a letter saying we do not feel that there would be any waiver of any privilege,
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On December 20, the Senate debated a resolution that directed the Senate Legal
Counsel to bring a civil action to enforce the subpoena.  The resolution invoked a
special statute regarding the authority of the Senate Legal Counsel to sue for
subpoena enforcement orders.111  In a letter on that same day to the committee, White
House Special Counsel Jane Sherburne described various options, stating: “We have
said all along that we are prepared to make the notes public; that all we need is an
assurance that other investigative bodies will not use this as an excuse to deny the
President the right to lawyer confidentiality that all Americans enjoy.”112  She said
that Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr had agreed that he would not argue that
turning over the Kennedy notes constituted a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
claimed by President Clinton.  The White House sought a similar understanding from
two House committees with jurisdiction over Whitewater matters.  Sherburne asked
the Senate for assistance in obtaining from the House the same understanding
reached with Starr.113
The resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 51 to 45.114  On the following day,
the White House agreed to give the Kennedy notes to the Senate Whitewater
Committee.  As part of the agreement, House Banking and Financial Services
Committee Chairman Jim Leach announced that the House would not try to later
assert that President Clinton had waived his attorney-client privilege.115 
The Contempt Power
When the executive branch refuses to release information or allow officials to
testify, Congress may decide to invoke its contempt power.  Although the legislative
power of contempt is not expressly provided for in the Constitution and exists as an
implied power, as early as 1821 the Supreme Court recognized that without this
power the legislative branch would be “exposed to every indignity and interruption
that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may mediate against it.”116  If either House
votes for a contempt citation, the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House
shall certify the facts to the appropriate U.S. Attorney, “whose duty it shall be to
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bring the matter before the grand jury for its action.”117  Individuals who refuse to
testify or produce papers are subject to criminal contempt, leading to fines and
imprisonment.118  Witnesses may invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.
This section begins by covering contempt actions, from 1975 to 1981, against
six Cabinet officers who refused to surrender documents to Congress: Secretary of
Commerce Rogers C. B. Morton,  Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary F. David
Mathews, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano,
Jr., Secretary of Energy Charles W. Duncan, Jr., and Secretary of Energy James B.
Edwards.  With contempt citations looming, the two branches reached a compromise
settlement that gave Congress access to the documents.  The remainder of the section
focuses on more recent contempt actions, including Secretary of the Interior James
Watt, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Anne Gorsuch, White
House Counsel Jack Quinn, and Attorney General Janet Reno.
The contempt action against Gorsuch revealed a weakness in the procedures that
Congress relies on for contempt, especially when the Justice Department has already
taken a position on legal and constitutional issues.  Citing an executive official for
contempt requires the executive branch––through a U.S. Attorney––to bring the
action.  In the Gorsuch case, which showcased executive privilege doctrines
advanced by the Justice Department, that action was slow in coming and required a
federal judge to nudge it along to encourage an accommodation between the two
branches.
Actions from1975 to 1981
From 1975 to the start of the Reagan Administration, Congress several times
threatened to hold executive officials in contempt for refusing to cooperate with
congressional committees.  In the face of statutory and constitutional reasons offered
by the Administration for withholding information from Congress, in the end the
committees persisted and gained access to the requested documents.  To minimize
some of these disputes in the future, Congress amended statutory language to clarify
the right of legislative committees to agency information.
Rogers C. B. Morton
A 1975 tug of war between the branches, with Congress the eventual victor,
concerned reports compiled by the Department of Commerce identifying the U.S.
companies that had been asked to join a boycott––organized by Arab nations––of
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companies doing business with Israel.  Secretary of Commerce Rogers Morton
refused to release the documents to a House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
subcommittee, citing the following language from Section 7(c) of the Export
Administration Act of 1969: “No department, agency, or official exercising any
functions under this Act shall publish or disclose information obtained hereunder
which is deemed confidential or with reference to which a request for confidential
treatment is made by the person furnishing such information, unless the head of such
department or agency determines that the withholding thereof is contrary to the
national interest.”119
In his letter of July 24, 1975, to the subcommittee, Morton said he understood
the need to provide Congress “with adequate information on which to legislate,” but
concluded that “disclosing the identity of reporting firms would accomplish little
other than to expose such firms to possible economic retaliation by certain private
groups merely because they reported a boycott request, whether or not they complied
with that request.”120  On July 28, the subcommittee issued a subpoena.  On August
22, in a letter to the committee, Morton again reiterated his refusal to release the
documents, explaining that his decision was not based “on any claim of executive
privilege, but rather on the exercise of the statutory discretion conferred upon me by
the Congress.”121  In other words, based on discretionary authority granted him by
Congress, he would deny information to a legislative committee.  He said he was
prepared to make copies of the documents available, “subject only to deletion of any
information which would disclose the identity of the firms reporting, and the details
of the commercial transactions involved.”122
At subcommittee hearings on September 22, Rep. John Moss, chairman of the
subcommittee seeking the documents, told Secretary Morton that Section 7(c) did not
“in any way refer to the Congress nor does the Chair believe that any acceptable
interpretation of that section could reach the result that Congress by implication had
surrendered its legislative and oversight authority under Article I and the Rules of the
House of Representatives.”123
Morton told Moss that he had been advised by Attorney General Edward Levi
not to make the documents available to the committee.124  In a letter dated September
4, 1975, Levi had advised Morton that the subpoena did not override the
confidentiality requirement of Section 7(c), and that the committee was not entitled
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to receive the information “unless, in exercising the discretion granted by § 7(c), you
determine that withholding them would be ‘contrary to the national interest.’”125  Levi
cited some earlier opinions by Attorneys General that “proceeded under the general
assumption––which I share––that statutory restrictions upon executive branch
disclosure of information are presumptively binding even with respect to requests or
demands of congressional committees.”126 
 
On November 11, the subcommittee voted 10 to 5 to find Morton in contempt
for failure to comply with the subpoena of July 28.127  The prospect of contempt
proceedings provided sufficient incentive for Morton to release the material to the
subcommittee.128  To avoid this problem in the future, Congress passed legislation
in 1977 to specify that Section 7(c) does not authorize the withholding of information
from Congress, and that any information obtained under the Export Administration
Act “shall be made available upon request to any committee or subcommittee of
Congress of appropriate jurisdiction.  No such committee or subcommittee shall
disclose any information obtained under this Act which is submitted on a confidential
basis unless the full committee determines that the withholding thereof is contrary
to the national interest.”129
David Mathews
On the same day that the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation
decided to cite Morton for contempt, it met to consider a separate contempt citation
against HEW Secretary F. David Mathews.130  The subcommittee, concerned that
some hospitals were receiving Medicare payments automatically without meeting
federal standards for the Medicare program, wanted letters Mathews had received
from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).131
  
In turning first  to his agency general counsel for legal advice, Mathews was told
not to release the documents to the subcommittee.  In a letter of October 17, 1975,
the general counsel limited his analysis to statutory construction.  He interpreted a
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confidentiality section in the Social Security Act as “on its face an absolute pledge
of confidentiality” because it contained no exceptions, either for Congress or the
judiciary.132  On the same day that Mathews received this legal guidance, he wrote
to the subcommittee that he had been advised that “it would be a violation of the law
for me to furnish you these JCAH documents given in confidence.”133
The subcommittee subpoenaed the material, setting a deadline of 10 a.m. on
November 12.  On the day of the deadline, Attorney General Levi advised Mathews
to produce the documents to the subcommittee.  Levi read the statutory language “on
a confidential basis” as placing in the HEW Secretary a discretionary authority to
assure that the information is “not to be made public but may be conveyed to the
Congress on proper request.”134  Levi’s analysis of the statutory provision “on its
face” differed fundamentally from Mathew’s general counsel.  Levi said this about
the reliance on the confidentiality provision:
It seems to me unlikely that reliance included some belief that the information
could be kept out of the hands of the Congress, since it was apparent upon the
face of the statute, that Congress knew the existence of these documents and the
identity of their sole possessor.  It was obvious that the Congress could as easily
subpoena the information from JCAH itself as from HEW.  Or, to place the
matter in its present context: It is apparent that if we now find, by reason of the
statute, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce cannot obtain the
information from HEW, they can immediately subpoena it from JCAH itself.
There hardly seems any purpose to be served by such a circuitous procedure, and
I think it would be unreasonable to assume that in enacting the vague and weak
confidentiality provision of this statute, and referring specifically to JCAH, the
Congress intended it.135
  
Mathews, by making the information available to the subcommittee, removed
the threat of a contempt citation.136
Henry Kissinger
On November 6, 1975, the House Select Committee on Intelligence issued a
subpoena to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, directing him to provide: “All
documents relating to State Department recommending covert action made to the
National Security Council and the Forty Committee and its predecessor committees
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from January 20, 1961 to the present.”  The Forty Committee made recommendations
to the President on specific covert actions.137  
The subpoenaed documents were referred to the White House for review.
Attorney General Levi examined the documents and concluded that executive
privilege could be appropriately invoked.  A letter to Kissinger on November 14,
from White House Counsel Philip Buchan, confirmed in writing the President’s
instruction to Kissinger to decline compliance with the subpoena.138 At stake were
ten documents, dating from 1962 through 1972, consisting of recommendations from
State Department officials to the Forty Committee, its predecessor (the 303
Committee), or to the President.139
When Kissinger failed to provide the documents by the deadline established in
the subpoena (November 11), the committee met in open session on November 14
to determine what action should be taken against him.  By a vote of 10 to 2, the
committee recommended that the Speaker certify the committee report regarding
Kissinger’s contumacious conduct and proceed to a contempt citation.140  Kissinger
responded that the subpoena raised “serious questions all over the world of what this
country is doing to itself and what the necessity is to torment ourselves like this
month after month.”141
Acting on the advice of the Justice Department, President Gerald Ford invoked
executive privilege on November 14 to keep the material from the committee.  In a
letter to the committee dated November 19 and released November 20, he said that
release of the documents, which included “recommendations from previous
Secretaries of State to previous Presidents,” would jeopardize the internal
decisionmaking process.142  A few days later, in a letter to the committee, Ford
cautioned that the dispute “involves grave matters affecting our conduct of foreign
policy and raises questions which go to ability of our Republic to govern itself
effectively.”143  Recognizing that Congress had constitutional responsibilities “to
investigate fully matters relating to contemplated legislation,”144 Ford told the
committee that he directed Kissinger not to comply with the subpoena on the grounds
of executive privilege because the documents “revealed to an unacceptable degree
the consultation process involving advice and recommendations to Presidents
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Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon.”145  Ford pointed out that some of the documents
concerned the National Security Council (NSC) and that, as of November 3,
Kissinger was no longer his National Security Adviser.146  As to those materials,
“there has been a substantial effort by the NSC staff to provide these documents.”147
Kissinger calling the contempt proceeding “an absurdity”148 and “frivolous,”
warning that it would have adverse effects worldwide: “I profoundly regret that the
committee saw fit to cite in contempt a secretary of state, raising serious questions
all over the world what this country is doing to itself.”149  On December 9, three
committee members and two staff members visited the White House to determine
which documents would be made available.150  The next day, they received an oral
briefing on the information that had been the target of the subpoena and an NSC aide
read verbatim from documents concerning the covert actions.151  On December 10,
the committee chairman announced that the White House was in “substantial
compliance” with the subpoena and that the contempt action was “moot.”152
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
In 1978, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce began an investigation into the manufacturing process used by drug
companies to make generic drugs and price brand-name drugs.  The panel looked into
charges that drug companies merely put trade names on drugs manufactured by
generic drug firms and sold them at much higher prices.  One way to claim
manufacturing responsibility was for a trade name company to put an employee in
a generic drug house while the product was being manufactured.  Rep. Al Gore
explained the subcommittee’s interest: “What we are seeking to do is to determine
whether or not the public is being fleeced by a process whereby brand name drug
companies are getting generic drugs and calling them special brand name drugs
simply because they resort to the rule of having one of their employees stationed at
the generic drug plant as the drugs are being made.”153
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In order to learn more about this “man-in-the-plant” strategy, the subcommittee
requested documents from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW).  The subcommittee had both oversight and legislative interests.  A bill (H.R.
12980) had been introduced to limit or eliminate the man-in-the-plant practice.154  In
July, subcommittee chairman John Moss sent several letters to HEW Secretary
Joseph A. Califano, Jr. for the documents.  Califano’s involvement added a rich
irony.  A few years earlier, when Moss sought trade secret data from the FTC, the
dispute eventually went to court in the case of Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, discussed
earlier.  The private attorney the subcommittee hired to represent its interest in court
was Califano.  He and Moss now found themselves on opposite sides of a similar
dispute.  
Failing to receive the material, the subcommittee agreed on July 27 to subpoena
Califano.  The full committee signed the subpoena on August 4.  In a memo dated
August 9, the Justice Department advised HEW that language in the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, prohibiting FDA employees from disclosing trade secret  information,
justified the withholding of the material from the subcommittee.  Section 301(j) of
that statute prohibited the “using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing,
other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department, or to the
courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this chapter, any information
acquired under authority [of specified sections] of this title concerning any method
or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection.”155  The Justice
Department memo argued:
Where an agency is barred by statute from disclosing certain information,
congressional committees have no right to that information unless there is a
clearly expressed congressional intent to exclude committee access from the
general restriction on disclosure. . . .
. . .  Indeed, it is significant that section 301(j) explicitly provides for
disclosure to one of the coordinate branches of government, i.e., the courts, but
makes no comparable provision for disclosure to committees of the Congress.156
This memo relied in part on Attorney General Levi’s memo in 1975 on the
Rogers Morton contempt action.  If that position were to stand, Congress would lose
access to documents covered by many other statutes.  At that time, about a hundred
statutory sections contained confidentiality provisions that could be interpreted by the
executive branch to deny committees information they needed for legislation and
oversight.157  The subcommittee therefore felt an obligation to challenge the Justice
Department analysis.  As Gore put it to Califano:
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 Mr. Secretary, in our society, laws, principles, and rights are often in
conflict.  We have two in conflict in this instance.
On the one hand we have article I of the U.S. Constitution.  On the other we
have section 301(j) of the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act.
You have chosen to place more importance on section 301(j) of the Federal
Food and Drug Cosmetic Act than on article I of the U.S. Constitution.158
The purpose of Section 301(j), Gore said, was to prevent FDA employees from
giving confidential trade secrets to competitor drug companies, not to keep from
Congress information that is readily available to the HEW Secretary.159  At a meeting
with the subcommittee on August 16, Califano produced some material but also
stated that any documents relating to trade secret information and the manufacturing
process would be blackened out because of the Justice Department legal analysis.160
Chairman Moss made it clear that the blackened-out material did not comply with the
subpoena.161  Califano explained that his refusal to release the unredacted material
had nothing to do with separation of powers or executive privilege, but rather with
the statutory language that prohibited the release of trade secret information.
Congress, he said, “has the power to change that statute.”162  Califano said he had no
question about the committee keeping information confidential: “Your record is
impeccable.”163
During the discussion with Califano, one subcommittee members asked whether
the confrontation between the two branches could be averted if the subcommittee
subpoenaed the companies directly for the manufacturing process information.
Subcommittee counsel John McElroy Atkisson answered that it would be possible,
and that the companies would have no legal ground for defying such subpoenas, but
said it “flies in the teeth of the idea . . . that the Congress would exclude itself from
the very same information conveniently in the hands of the Secretary which is only
down the block here.”164  Chairman Moss added that the Justice Department analysis
opened “a pandora’s box” to a hundred similar statutes that could be used to deny
information to Congress.  Moreover, accepting Califano’s suggestion to rewrite the
statute would take the committee from an option that enjoys privileged status in the
House (a contempt citation) to the process of amending a statute, which is not
privileged and could take a year or two.165 
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Moss told Califano that he was “without legal justification in your refusal to
comply with the subcommittee’s subpena.”166  Califano persisted in his refusal,
stating that he was “bound to follow the opinion of the Attorney General.”167  The
subcommittee then voted 9 to 8 on August 16 to find Califano in contempt for failing
to comply with the subpoena.168  A month later, the subcommittee dropped the
contempt action after Califano turned over the materials that had been subpoenaed.
Califano explained that a further review by the department of the withheld material
disclosed that some information had been “inappropriately deleted” from documents
given to the panel.169
On August 17, on the day after the subcommittee voted for contempt, Califano
asked the Justice Department to further consider its interpretation of Section 301(j).
On September 8, Attorney General Griffin Bell cited additional legislative history in
affirming the position of Acting Attorney General Egan that the section prohibited
Califano from furnishing trade secret data to Congress or its committees.170
Notwithstanding that legal analysis, Califano gave the disputed materials to the
subcommittee.
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.
On April 2, 1980, President Carter imposed a fee on imported oil and gasoline
in an effort to reduce domestic consumption. A subcommittee of the House
Government Operations Committee requested in writing, on April 8, certain
categories of material from the Department of Energy (DOE).  With no documents
delivered, the subcommittee held a hearing on April 16 to investigate the delay.
Thomas Newkirk, the department’s Deputy General Counsel for Regulation, told the
subcommittee that he was “not prepared to submit the documents at this time”
because White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler was reviewing a pile of documents
“between a foot and 18 inches high.”171 Newkirk thought the documents might be
subject to the claim of executive privilege because they revealed the “deliberative
process underlying the President’s decision to impose the gasoline conservation
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fee.”172  The subcommittee voted unanimously to instruct Newkirk to deliver the
documents by 5 o’clock that evening.173  
After the department failed to meet the deadline, the subcommittee voted
unanimously on April 22 to subpoena the materials from Energy Secretary Charles
W.  Duncan, Jr.  On the following day, the subcommittee received 28 documents but
also a letter from Duncan explaining that to the extent the subcommittee request
involved “deliberative materials underlying a major Presidential decision,” it would
“seriously undermine the ability of the Chief Executive and his Cabinet Officers to
obtain frank legal and policy advice from their advisors.”174  Newkirk appeared
before the subcommittee on April 24 to state that the department would not comply
in full with the subcommittee’s request of April 8, but did not rest his case on
executive privilege.175  By a vote of 9-0, the subcommittee subpoenaed Duncan to
appear before the subcommittee on April 29 and bring the requested documents.176
Duncan, appearing at the April 29 hearing, told the subcommittee: “I must
decline to turn over the documents and I do not have them with me at this time.”177
However, he also offered to allow the subcommittee chairman and the ranking
minority member to review the documents “in confidence to assist in defining that
request.”178  Rep. Paul McCloskey (the ranking minority member) objected that “the
idea that two members of a nine-member committee should be trusted and some
should not be is repugnant to the rules of the House.”179  After further efforts to reach
an accommodation failed, the subcommittee voted 8 to 0 to hold Duncan in contempt
for not complying with the April 24 subpoena.180  
The subcommittee held another hearing on May 14, with Secretary Duncan
again in attendance.  Rep. Toby Moffett, subcommittee chairman, announced that “at
long last the subcommittee has been provided with every document it feels it needs
to conduct its inquiry.  Subcommittee members and staff have seen every document
specifically demanded under the subpena we issued April 24, and any document we
deemed useful to this investigation has now been produced.”181  On the previous day,
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a federal district court had struck down Carter’s April 2 proclamation as invalid,
either under the President’s inherent power or under statutory authority.182  A White
House spokesman said that he didn’t think executive privilege was ever formally
asserted, either by President Carter or Secretary Duncan, although there was
consideration of doing so.183  In any event, the subcommittee received the material
it requested.184
James B. Edwards
The following year, at the start of the Reagan Administration, Secretary of
Energy James B. Edwards narrowly avoided a contempt citation from the House
Government Operations Committee.  The dispute involved legislative access to
documents regarding contract negotiations between the Energy Department and the
Union Oil Company to build an oil shale plant in Colorado.  Committee members
were concerned that the department was moving too hastily in awarding billions of
dollars in federal subsidies to major oil companies, particularly prior to the Reagan
Administration’s decision whether to create a Synthetic Fuels Corporation.185  Failing
to obtain the requested materials, the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources
Subcommittee voted 6 to 4 on July 23 to hold Edwards in contempt.
The issue was complicated by disagreement within the Administration.
Edwards wanted to sign the contract, but OMB Director David Stockman opposed
federal subsidies to the synthetic fuels program and had taken steps to block the
contract with Union Oil.186  The full committee was scheduled to vote on the
contempt citation on the morning of July 30, 1981.  Edwards said he would not
produce the documents until the contract between the Energy Department and Union
Oil had been signed. President Reagan agreed to the project and officials from the
Energy Department and Union signed the contract.  Thirteen boxes of documents on
the contract negotiations were delivered to the committee.187
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James Watt
In 1981, Interior Secretary James Watt refused to give a House subcommittee
31 documents relating to a reciprocity provision in the Mineral Lands Leasing Act.
The specific country involved was Canada.  Watt based his decision on the judgment
of Attorney General William French Smith that the documents were “either necessary
and fundamental to the deliberative process presently ongoing in the Executive
Branch or relate to sensitive foreign policy considerations.”188  It marked President
Reagan’s first claim of executive privilege.189  The confrontation escalated to a
recommendation by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce to cite Watt for
contempt.
 Attorney General Smith insisted that “the interest of Congress in obtaining
information for oversight purposes is, I believe, considerably weaker than its interests
when specific legislative proposals are in question.”190  Congressional oversight, he
said, “is justifiable only as a means of facilitating the legislative task of enacting,
amending, or repealing laws.”191  That argument lacked historical and legal support.
The first major investigation by Congress––of General St. Clair’s defeat––was not
conducted for the purpose of legislation.   The Supreme recognizes that the power of
Congress to conduct investigations “comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste.”192  Courts have
consistently held that the investigative power is available not merely to legislate or
when a “potential” for legislation exists, but even for pursuits down blind alleys.193
 Moreover, Congress could easily circumvent Smith’s argument by introducing a bill
whenever it wanted to conduct oversight.
Smith’s second major argument for withholding the documents was based on
the need to protect the deliberative process, especially “predecisional, deliberative
memoranda.”  Even after decisions have been made, disclosure of documents to
Congress “could still deter the candor of future Executive Branch deliberations.”194
While Exemption 5 of FOIA exempts from public disclosure “inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other
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than an agency in litigation with the agency,”195 Congress specifically provided in
FOIA that the listed exemptions are “not authority to withhold documents from
Congress.”196  Congress has often gained access to predecisional, deliberative
memoranda in the executive branch.197
As a third point, Smith argued that the documents “relate to sensitive foreign
policy considerations.”198  However, foreign policy is not an exclusive power of the
President or the executive branch.  In seeking the documents from Watt, Congress
had a constitutionally-based need for the information: Its power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations.”199  Throughout its history, Congress has legislated
on international trade, foreign assistance, arms sales, and other matters of foreign
policy.
In response to Smith’s legal position, the subcommittee prepared a contempt
citation against Watt.200  Some of the documents, during this period, were shared with
the subcommittee.  On February 9, 1982, the subcommittee voted 11 to 6 to hold
Watt in contempt.201  By that time, all but seven of the 31 subpoenaed documents had
been given to the subcommittee.202  On February 25, the full committee voted 23 to
19 for contempt.203  White House Counsel Fred Fielding offered to brief committee
members on the seven documents, but lawmakers rejected his offer.204
Although Watt said he would rather go to jail than surrender the remaining
materials,205 those documents were reviewed by subcommittee members.  The
Administration established several conditions.  The documents would be delivered
to a room in the Rayburn House Office Building, where committee members would
have four hours to examine the documents and take notes.  Lawmakers could not
photocopy the documents or show them to committee staff.  Also, the committee
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agreed not to release any information that might harm the national interest in dealing
with Canada.206  
A newspaper account reports that the ranking Republican on the subcommittee,
Marc L. Marks, concluded there was “nothing sensitive in these documents.  Watt
would have given over the papers had the White House not intervened.”207  During
a committee meeting, Marks attributed the impasse with Watt to “an irrational
decision made by the White House, put into effect by a President who I cannot
believe understood the ramifications of what he was doing.”208  Marks regretted the
decision to exclude staff, calling it “illegal because . . . the first person that we are
going to turn to that everybody expects us to turn to discuss what the papers show,
will naturally be our staff person.”209  Rep. Mike Synar pointed out that “23 members
of the Interior Department and other departments saw these documents.  We found
in one case it was a law student, an intern at the time, who later became an
official.”210 
Gorsuch Contempt
The accommodation over the Watt documents should have formed a better
understanding between Congress and the Justice Department.  Indeed, when the
oversight subcommittee of the House Public Works Committee sought documents
on the EPA’s enforcement of the “Superfund” program, it was advised by the agency
that there would be no objection “so long as the confidentiality of the information in
those files was maintained.”211  The subcommittee had been investigating the $1.6
billion program established by Congress to clean up hazardous-waste sites and to
prosecute companies responsible for illegal dumping.
Shortly thereafter the Reagan Administration decided that Congress could not
see documents in active litigation files. The Administration’s reversal appeared to be
triggered by requests from other committees for comparable documents.  Another
oversight panel from the House Energy and Commerce Committee wanted access to
the same type of information.  The Administration expressed concern that executive
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branch control would be undermined by these multiple requests.212  Both oversight
subcommittees had reason to suspect that the major chemical companies were not
paying their full share of the costs, requiring taxpayers to pick up the balance.213
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch, acting under instructions from President
Reagan (meaning the Justice Department), refused to turn over “sensitive documents
found in open law enforcement files.”  Reagan’s memorandum to her, dated
November 30, 1982, claimed that those documents represented “internal deliberative
materials containing enforcement strategy and statements of the government’s
positions on various legal issues which may be raised in enforcement actions relative
to the various hazardous waste sites” by the EPA or the Department of Justice.214  On
December 2, the Administration withheld 64 documents from the subcommittee.215
The Administration’s initial position in the Watt dispute had not changed.  It still
assumed that since documents shared with Congress might find their way into the
public realm, they should not be shared at all.  Following that logic, congressional
oversight would have to be put on hold for years until the government completed its
enforcement actions.
By a vote of 9 to 2, a subcommittee of the House Public Works Committee
decided to cite Gorsuch for contempt.216  The full committee did likewise, after it
rejected a Justice Department proposal to give briefings on the contents of the
documents.217  The House of Representatives voted 259 to 105 to support the
contempt citation.  Although partisan overtones were present, 55 Republicans joined
204 Democrats to build the top-heavy majority.218  Pursuant to the statutory
procedures for contempt citations, the Speaker certified the facts and referred them
to the U.S. Attorney for presentation to a grand jury.
The Justice Department, anticipating the House vote, moved quickly:
“Immediately after the House vote and prior to the delivery of the contempt
citation,”219 the department chose not to prosecute the case.  Instead, it asked a
district court to declare the House action an unconstitutional intrusion into the
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Stanley S. Harris, responsible for bringing the case to a grand jury, listed his name
on the Justice Department complaint and advised Congress that “it would not be
appropriate for me to consider bringing this matter before a grand jury until the civil
action has been resolved.”221
  
The Justice Department occupied an unusual ethical position.  First it had
advised Gorsuch to withhold the documents, and now it decided not to prosecute her
for adhering to the department’s legal analysis.  In court, the department argued that
the contempt action marked an “unwarranted burden on executive privilege” and an
“interference with the executive’s ability to carry out the laws.”  Counsel for the
House of Representatives urged the court not to intervene, requesting it to dismiss the
case.222
The court dismissed the government’s suit on the ground that judicial
intervention in executive-legislative disputes “should be delayed until all possibilities
for settlement have been exhausted.”223  The court urged both parties to devote their
energies to compromise and cooperation, not confrontation.224  After the court’s
decision, which the Justice Department chose not to appeal, the Administration
agreed to release “enforcement sensitive” documents to the House Public Works
Committees, beginning with briefings and redacted copies and eventually ending
with the unredacted documents.  The unredacted documents could be examined by
committee members and up to two staff persons.225 
One of the casualties of the House investigation into the Superfund program was
former EPA official Rita M. Lavelle.  The House Energy and Commerce Committee
voted unanimously to hold her in contempt for defying a committee subpoena to
testify.226  The House voted 413 to zero to hold her contempt.227  She was sentenced
in 1984 to 6 months in prison, 5 years’ probation, and a fine of $10,000 for lying to
Congress about her management of the Superfund program.  She was the only EPA
official indicted in the scandal, but more than 20 other top officials, including Anne
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Gorsuch, left the EPA amid allegations of perjury, conflict of interest, and political
manipulation of the agency.228
Following the Gorsuch contempt, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote an opinion
on May 30, 1984, concluding that as a matter of statutory interpretation and
separation of powers analysis, a U.S. Attorney is not required to bring a
congressional contempt citation to a grand jury when the citation is directed against
an executive official who is carrying out the President’s decision to invoke executive
privilege.229  The memo regarded the threat of criminal prosecution from a
congressional contempt citation as an “unreasonable, unwarranted, and therefore
intolerable burden” on the President’s exercise of constitutional authority, and that
Congress “has other methods available to test the validity of a privilege claim and to
obtain the documents that its seeks.”230  The memo cautioned that its analysis was
“limited to the unique circumstances that gave rise to these questions late in 1982 and
early 1983,”231 and that “prudence” should limit the conclusions in the memo “to
controversies similar to the one to which this memorandum expressly relates, and the
general statements of legal principles should be applied in other contexts only after
careful analysis.”232
Travelgate and Jack Quinn
The House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight conducted an
investigation of the 1993 firings of seven Travel Office employees in the Clinton
White House.  Although President Clinton had full authority to fire these employees,
the manner of their discharge led to investigations by Congress, the General
Accounting Office, the press, and the independent counsel.  On May 19, 1993, they
were dismissed with the charge that they followed poor management practices.  Dee
Dee Myers, Clinton’s press secretary, also stated that the FBI had been asked to
examine the records in the Travel Office, suggesting that the employees might have
been guilty of criminal action as well.  The way the White House replaced the seven
employees soon raised charges of nepotism and cronyism.233  
The House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight received the
documents it requested from the Justice Department and other federal agencies, but
in September 1995 the White House informed the panel that President Clinton might
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claim executive privilege and refuse to turn over some or all of 907 documents.234
In January 1996, the committee subpoenaed the records from the White House, and
in May it announced that it would hold the White House in contempt unless it turned
over the materials.235  White House Counsel Jack Quinn wrote to Committee
Chairman William F. Clinger, Jr.: “Let me be blunt: this threat can only be
characterized as a desperate political act meant to resuscitate interest in a story that
long ago died.”  Quinn objected to a legislative inquiry that had become, he said, “a
tiresome fishing expedition” and a “wild good chase.”236  On May 9, the committee
voted 27 to 19 to hold Quinn in contempt as well as two others: former White House
Director of Administration David Watkins and his aide, Matthew Moore.237  
Clinger offered to delay the next step––sending the contempt citation to the
House for a vote–– to leave open the possibility of an accommodation with the White
House.238  He offered to have Quinn come to the committee before floor action.239
Thereafter, the Administration released about 1,000 pages of documents to the
committee just hours before the House was scheduled to take up the contempt vote.
Contempt Action Against Reno
Late in 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno responded to a subpoena from the
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, chaired by Rep. Dan Burton.
She declined to give the committee a memorandum sent to her by FBI Director Louis
J. Freeh, who had urged the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate
allegations of criminal conduct in campaign finance.  Justice Department officials
said that both Reno and Freeh advised the committee that it was inappropriate to
provide a congressional committee with a departmental document that included
analysis about an ongoing investigation.  They agreed on the need to withhold the
document because of “the need to protect the confidentiality and independence of an
ongoing investigation and our prosecutorial decisionmaking.”240
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On July 27, 1998, the Justice Department refused to turn over two internal
documents that recommended the appointment of an independent counsel in the
campaign finance investigation.  The House committee had subpoened a 27-page
memo to Reno by Freeh and a 94-page report by Charles G. LaBella, former head of
the department’s campaign finance task force.  Instead of turning over the two
documents, the Justice Department offered to brief the committee members on the
contents of the memos.  Chairman Burton rejected the proposal.241  
After the department’s refusal to release the documents, the House committee
voted 24 to 19 on August 6 to cite Reno for contempt.  She warned that release of the
documents would “provide criminals, targets and defense lawyers alike with a road
map to our investigations.”242  She offered to brief the committee in public session
“on the legal rationale” presented in the two memos, but only after she had made a
decision on whether to seek an independent counsel.243  At a news conference, she
said that for a committee to ask for an internal department document before she
reached a decision “is a form of “political tampering that no prosecutor in America
can accept.”244
The following month, Reno gave Chairman Burton access to heavily redacted
versions of the memos, leaving him roughly thirty percent to read.245  Burton asked
Reno to allow three former prosecutors and a former White House deputy counsel to
review the memos and give their opinions to him and to the House Republican
leadership.  She rejected that proposal.246  She did agree, however, to allow six other
Republican members of the committee to view the redacted copy, but insisted that
Burton withdraw the subpoena and drop the contempt citation.247 After these attempts
to find common ground failed, Burton moved forward with the contempt citation.
Although the committee recommended holding Reno in contempt, the matter was not
taken to the floor for House action.
As part of the impeachment action against President Clinton, members of the
House Judiciary Committee were allowed to read the Freeh and LaBella documents.
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On December 2, 1998, U.S. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson granted the
committee limited access to the two memos.248  On June 6, 2000, the House
Government Reform Committee released the Freeh and LaBella memos along with
other Justice Department documents related to the refusal to appoint an independent
counsel to investigate campaign finance issues of the 1996 presidential election.249
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Conclusions
Committee subpoenas and contempt citations have been effective instruments
for gaining access to executive branch documents that are initially withheld.  The
pressure that builds from these two techniques generally results in the Administration
offering new accommodations to satisfy legislative needs.  Although both branches
at times seek assistance from the courts, the general message from federal judges is
that an agreement hammered out between the two branches is better than a directive
handed down by a court.
The executive-legislative conflicts described in this report offer several lessons
about access to information.  Congress has as much right to agency documents for
oversight purposes as it does for legislation.  Executive claims of “deliberative
process,” “enforcement sensitive,” “ongoing investigation,” or “foreign policy
considerations” have not been, in themselves, adequate grounds for keeping
documents from Congress.  On the issue of withholding information from Congress,
there are often sharp differences within an Administration, especially between the
Justice Department and the agencies.
Further, these case studies show that statutory language that authorizes
withholding information from the public is not a legitimate reason for withholding
information from Congress.  Sharing sensitive information with congressional
committees is not the same as sharing information with the public.  Courts assume
that congressional committees will exercise their powers responsibly.  Legislative
committees have demonstrated that they have reliable procedures for protecting
confidentiality.  Finally, congressional capacity to subpoena agency documents from
private organizations is not an adequate substitute for receiving them directly from
the agency. 
